Published in Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Fall 2011) p. 377–396.
© 2011 by the American Bar Association. All Rights Reserved.

Black v. Simms: A Lost Opportunity
to Benefit Children by Preserving
Sibling Relationships When Same-Sex
Families Dissolve
NATALIE AMATO*

I. Introduction
The changing composition of the American family has altered the reality of children living in the United States, but some states have failed to
adapt to that reality. As Justice O’Connor opined in Troxel v. Granville,
“[t]he demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak
of an average American family.”1 These changes include a rising number
of households headed by same-sex couples who are raising children. In
2010, more than 2.5 million children in the United States lived with an
unmarried parent and that parent’s partner.2
Over the last decade, custody and visitation law also has undergone significant change. Recent reforms have strengthened parental autonomy,
while concurrently expanding the category of who may be considered a
parent.3 For example, courts may bestow parental rights on de facto parents: individuals who, while not legal parents, lived with a child for a significant period of time and functioned as a child’s parent.4 In some states,
* First-place winner, 2011 Schwab Essay Contest. Graduated in 2011 from the University
of Maryland School of Law where she participated in the Juvenile Law Clinic and interned for
the Honorable Catherine C. Blake on the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. She would like to thank Professor Jana Singer for her encouragement and advice
during the writing of this article.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality).
2. America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, tbl. C3
(2010), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html.
3. Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 5, 5 (2002).
4. A. L. I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1)(c) (2002). For cases
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gay and lesbian de facto parents have obtained increased access to children with whom they have important, psychological relationships.5 In others, the strength of legal parents’ rights to the care, custody, and control
of their children has created a near absolute bar to the claims of gay and
lesbian de facto parents.6 This disparity directly impacts children, and in
some cases, may determine whether they are able to maintain relationships with their siblings. The law’s failure to recognize parental rights for
gay and lesbian de facto parents endangers these relationships, ones that
ultimately affect the well-being of children.
The Louisiana case of Black v. Simms7 serves as a prism through which
to examine how courts may better protect children of same-sex unions. In
Black, the Louisiana Court of Appeal held that Kimberlee Corianne Black
could not be considered a functional, or de facto, parent to Braelyn, the
child born to her same-sex partner, Kimberly Renae Simms. Black and
Simms used the same sperm donor and each bore a child. For six years,
Black, Simms, and half-siblings, Braelyn and Eli, lived together as a cohesive family unit. When the couple’s relationship ended, Simms cut off all
contact between Braelyn and Black, as well as between Braelyn and her
half-brother, Eli. Braelyn’s relationship with Eli was permanently severed
when the Louisiana Court of Appeal denied Black access to Braelyn and
failed to make provisions for the siblings to maintain contact.
Part II of this article discusses the facts and procedural history of the
Black case. Part III reviews Troxel v. Granville,8 the Supreme Court’s
most recent decision regarding third-party visitation. Part IV describes the
social science evidence, case law, and legal scholarship that demonstrate
that children benefit when they are able to maintain legal and psychological ties with their siblings. Part V discusses the Louisiana Court of
Appeal’s reasoning in Black. Part VI critiques the Black decision because
the Louisiana Court of Appeal failed to act in the best interests of Braelyn
and Eli. The article concludes that the recognition of gay and lesbian de
facto parents’ rights benefits children by protecting sibling relationships,
discussing the common law de facto parenthood standard, see Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595
(Mont. 2009); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d
539 (N.J. 2000); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); In re Custody of H.S.H.K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
5. See, e.g., Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010); Kulstad, 220 P.3d 595;
In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161; V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539; E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711
N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419.
6. See, e.g., Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Janice M. v. Margaret
K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008); Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In
re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
7. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1141–45.
8. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (plurality) (2000).
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which are crucial to children’s emotional, intellectual, social, and psychological development. Black serves as an important example of the harm
that may come to children of same-sex couples when the law fails to adapt
to the changing composition of the American family.
II. Black v. Simms: Factual Background and Procedural History
Kimberlee Corianne Black and Kimberly Renae Simms lived together
with their two children as a family unit in Shreveport, Louisiana, for at
least six years until they permanently ended their relationship in February
2006.9 Their eldest child, Braelyn, was born to Simms in 2000. The couple planned and prepared for the birth together: Black helped Simms pay
for her assisted reproduction procedures, attended the appointments with
Simms, and was present at Braelyn’s birth. Using the same sperm donor,
Black gave birth to Braelyn’s half-brother, Eli, two years later.10
Simms and Black began to have problems in 2004, so Simms moved
out of their home for a short period of time. Simms ultimately moved back
in with Black, who was also living with her parents, Sheri and Robert
Black. Black’s parents later testified at trial about the “love, devotion, and
time” the family had spent raising Braelyn while she lived with them.11 In
February 2006, the couple’s relationship ended when Simms became
involved with another woman. From February until May 2006, Simms
allowed Black to have visitation with Braelyn, during which Black would
“take Braelyn for the weekend.”12 During those visits, Braelyn also interacted and lived with her half-brother, Eli. These visits ceased after a
confrontation in May 2006 when Simms came to pick Braelyn up. After
that point, Simms cut off all contact between Braelyn and Black, as well
as between Braelyn and Eli.
On June 1, 2007, Black filed a petition for sole custody, or in the alternative, joint custody with reasonable visitation, of Braelyn. During a hearing on June 19, 2007, Simms was ordered to allow Braelyn to call Black
once a week. A mental health evaluation was also ordered to assess
whether it was in Braelyn’s best interest for her to have access to Black
and Eli. Based on the court’s order, Cindy Nassar, a licensed professional counselor, evaluated Braelyn. Nassar testified that Braelyn had an
“emotional connection” to the Black family and that Braelyn’s “view of
9. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1141, 1144.
10. Id. at 1141. It is not clear whether joint or second parent adoption is permitted in
Louisiana. See Louisiana Adoption Law, http://www.hrc.org/issues/parenting/adoptions/978.
htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2011). Louisiana has not adopted a statutory or judicial de facto
parenthood standard. Black, 12 So. 3d 1140.
11. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1141, 1144.
12. Id. at 1141.
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dependability and predictability would be threatened if she did not
reestablish her relationship with her psychological family,”13 including
Eli. A social worker, Robbie Dowden, who was working with Simms, also
included Braelyn in a few sessions. Braelyn told Dowden that she missed
the Blacks. Although she does not appear to have independently evaluated Braelyn or to have spoken to the Blacks or Eli, Dowden concluded that
it would be in Braelyn’s best interest if she were denied all access to the
Black family.14
After a hearing regarding Black’s custody petition, the trial court granted an involuntary dismissal of her claims in June 2008. A panel of three
judges on Louisiana’s Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit reviewed
Black’s appeal to determine whether a third party who has acted as a
child’s de facto parent may obtain sole or joint custody without showing
that an award of sole custody to the legal parent would cause substantial
harm to the child.15
III. Troxel v. Granville: Leaving the Door Open
for Untraditional Families
Troxel v. Granville limited the rights of third parties seeking visitation
over the objections of a legal parent, but left the door open for de facto
parental rights. Paternal grandparents, Jenifer and Gary Troxel, petitioned
for visitation with their grandchildren after their son committed suicide
and the children’s mother attempted to limit their visitation to once per
month.16 Although the trial court found that visitation with their grandparents was in the children’s best interests, the Washington Supreme
Court ultimately upheld the reversal of the trial court’s grant of visitation
to the Troxels and held that Washington’s visitation statute was unconstitutional for two reasons. First, the Constitution permits a state to interfere
with a parent’s right to rear his or her children only to prevent harm or
potential harm to a child. Second, Washington’s visitation statute was
simply too broad.17 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The plurality opinion authored by Justice O’Conner invalidated the
Washington statute as applied, but declined to answer the “primary constitutional question”: whether a showing of harm or potential harm must
13. Id. at 1144, 1145.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1140.
16. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60–61 (2000) (plurality). The Troxels sought visitation under a Washington statute that allowed any person to petition a state court for visitation
rights at any time and authorized the court to order visitation if it was in the best interests of the
child. Id. at 61.
17. Id. at 63.
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be demonstrated in a dispute between a legal parent and a third party.18
Additionally, the plurality did not apply a strict scrutiny analysis. Rather,
the plurality agreed that Washington’s visitation statute was “breathtakingly broad,” and upheld the long-held “presumption that fit parents act in
the best interests of their children.”19 The decision of the children’s legal
parent, Tammie Granville, was entitled to “special weight,” particularly
since Granville had not cut off all contact. The plurality also seemed to
indicate that once the appropriate deference was paid to a legal parent’s
decision, a third party could potentially rebut the presumption that the parent’s decision was made in the child’s best interest.20
The Troxel opinion left many unanswered questions and revealed the
deep fractures within the Court regarding the nature of parental rights.
First, the Court did not define who may be a parent. Second, the Court did
not describe how much deference must be paid to a legal parent’s decision
making, or define the “special weight” that must be applied to such decisions. Although the plurality recognized the changing demographics of
the American family, including the assumption of parental duties by “persons outside the nuclear family,” it also stated that the extension of statutory rights to “persons other than a child’s parents” places a “substantial
burden on the traditional parent-child relationship.”21
Justice Kennedy, in dissent, expressed concern that the best interest’s
standard should not be forsaken or minimalized, even when a legal parent’s liberty interests are at stake.22 In particular, Justice Kennedy stated
that a fit parent’s rights, versus a complete stranger’s, is an entirely different situation than a fit parent’s rights versus another legal, biological,
or de facto parent. In instances where a third party has acted as a de facto
parent, the best interests standard might need to be employed to avoid
harming a child by separating him or her from a third party, with whom,
the child has a substantial relationship.23 Additionally, Justice Kennedy
opined that the broad standard set forth by the plurality was based on
faulty assumptions about the composition of American families and did
not properly anticipate the claims that might arise based on the reality
18. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 62–63 (plurality). The Troxels did not claim they acted as de facto
parents, but petitioned in their capacity as the children’s paternal grandparents, which the
Washington Supreme Court found was permitted by the plain language of Washington’s visitation statute.
19. Id. at 67, 68, 73; see also id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“the presumption that
parental decisions generally serve the best interests of their children is sound”).
20. Id. at 70.
21. Id. at 63–64.
22. Id. at 94, 99–101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 99.
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many children experience.24
Also in dissent, Justice Stevens noted that disputes between a parent
and third parties, with whom, children have an interest in maintaining a
relationship necessitate a different approach, that is, a consideration of the
child’s interests.25 According to Justice Stevens, a parent’s liberty interest
is not an “isolated right,” but is one that must be viewed within the greater
context of a child’s relationships.26 In fact, in some circumstances, a child
might have “a stronger interest at stake than mere protection from serious
harm” and may even possess “liberty interests in preserving established
familial or family-like bonds” similar to those parental liberty interests the
Court has long upheld.27
Although the Troxel opinion revealed deep divisions regarding the
nature of parental rights, the Court ultimately upheld a legal parent’s right
to the care, nurture, and custody of his or her children. Several justices
expressed awareness of the changing landscape of the American family,
including the importance of de facto parents, and both Justices Kennedy
and Stevens indicated that the plurality’s opinion fell far short of recognizing that transformation.
IV. The Benefits of Maintaining Sibling Relationships
Social science evidence, legal scholarship, and case law support the
importance of the maintenance of sibling relationships. In 2004, twelve
percent of all children lived with at least one half-sibling, and another two
percent lived with at least one adopted sibling.28 Although a limited number of states have sibling visitation laws, they often are not “practically
24. Id. at 98. For example, Justice Kennedy noted that the plurality seemed to assume that
legal parents contesting visitation have, in fact, acted as primary caregivers, that third parties
who seek visitation have “no legitimate and established relationship with the child,” and that the
“conventional nuclear family ought to establish the visitation standard” in all cases, even though
the plurality itself recognized that such a model is not the “prevailing condition in many households.” Id.
25. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 88. As he explains:
A parent’s rights with respect to her child have thus never been regarded as absolute, but rather
are limited by the existence of an actual, developed relationship with a child, and are tied to
the presence or absence of some embodiment of family. These limitations have arisen, not
simply out of the definition of parenthood itself, but because of this Court’s assumption that a
parent’s interests in a child must be balanced against the State’s long-recognized interests as
parens patriae, and critically, the child’s own complementary interest in preserving relationships that serve their welfare and protection. Id.

27. Id. at 88, 90. Justice Stevens’ dissent is not the first time the Supreme Court has indicated that children may have interests that directly conflict with those of their parents. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
28. Rose M. Kreider, U.S. Census Bureau, Living Arrangements of Children: 2004, at 8
(2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p70-114.pdf.
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enforceable.”29 Children who have been raised in same-sex households
are particularly at risk of being separated from their biological or adoptive
siblings. The outcomes for these children vary widely from state to state,
and, thus, the recognition of gay and lesbian de facto parental rights is crucial to preserving sibling relationships.
Three main arguments support the importance of maintaining sibling
relationships: (1) separating biological or adoptive siblings has a negative
impact on children’s development and causes them psychological harm
and emotional distress; (2) the sibling relationship is different in kind
from a child’s relationship with other third parties; and (3) the preservation of sibling relationships has larger societal consequences because it
safeguards a child’s network of social connections and support, which
often becomes important during adulthood.
A. The Negative Impact of Sibling Separation on
Children’s Development
The intellectual, psychological, social, and emotional growth of children is affected by their relationships with their siblings, but is often
impaired when siblings are separated.30 Frequent sibling interaction influences a child’s intellectual development in numerous ways, including fostering complex thinking and advancing conversational skills and vocabulary usage. For example, extensive interaction with siblings helps children
develop higher order thinking, such as understanding false belief.31 When
both a parent and an older sibling engage in make-believe play with
younger children, the children are more likely to imitate the actions of the
sibling, rather than those of the adult. This may indicate that a sibling’s
actions are more understandable to and manageable for a young child,
and, thus, that a young child is likely to learn more quickly from siblings
who are close in age to him or her than from adults. As children grow
older and enter more strenuous intellectual environments, older siblings
often help younger siblings with academic and peer challenges.32
Children may be less likely to join in conversations between adults, so
interaction with a sibling will positively enhance a young child’s conversational skills. For example, toddlers will closely monitor conversation
between older siblings and parents, often attempting to join in. When they
join in, “verbal exchanges last longer, with each participant taking more
29. Robin L. Marshall, Comment, In the Best Interest of the Child: Establishing a Right for
Half Siblings to Remain Together After the Death of the Common Parent, 22 J. JUV. L. 100, 100
(2001).
30. JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 175 (2006).
31. LAURA E. BERK, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 451 (8th ed. 2009).
32. Id. at 583.

384

Family Law Quarterly, Volume 45, Number 3, Fall 2011

turns.” Additionally, older siblings often make comments to younger siblings that suggest the older children are regulating aspects of social interaction (e.g., taking turns speaking).33
The sibling relationship helps children develop their understanding of
family and influences social development.34 Acting as “socialization
agents,” siblings “teach one another social skills through their long-term
interactions,” including motor and language skills, a moral compass, and
a sense of gender roles. Interactions with siblings build “a foundation for
later learning and personality development.”35 While only children often
have closer relationships with their parents, they “tend to be less wellaccepted in the peer group, perhaps because they have not had opportunities to learn effective conflict-resolution strategies through sibling interactions.”36 In general, “positive sibling ties predict favorable adjustment,
even among hostile children at risk for social difficulties.”
Siblings also share emotional bonds, love, and affection. Over the
course of their relationships with siblings, children experience and develop a wide range of emotions, including resentment, affection, and sympathetic concern.37 When parents encourage positive sibling relationships,
children learn to turn to one another for emotional support.38 “Children
with siblings—especially older siblings—participate in more family talk
about thoughts, beliefs, and emotions.”39 This develops a high level of
emotional intelligence and maturity, which likely contributes to future
relationship success. Finally, siblings have a “history of shared experiences,” as well as, shared medical and genetic histories, all of which contribute to a more highly developed sense of identity.
Courts that refuse to consider or grant the custody and visitation claims
of gay and lesbian de facto parents harm children by severing important
ties with their siblings, in some cases, permanently. Such “emotional losses” have a deep impact on children, and are not lessened by the fact that
a child has been raised in a same-sex family.40 When considering custody
or visitation disputes between same-sex parents, courts should endeavor
33. Id. at 389.
34. Marshall, supra note 29, at 104–05.
35. Joel V. Williams, Sibling Rights to Visitation: A Relationship Too Valuable To Be
Denied, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 259, 260–61 (1995).
36. Id. at 583.
37. Id. at 582. For example, older children will often comfort distressed younger siblings
and alert parents to their needs. In turn, younger siblings often feel comforted by the presence
of their siblings during a parent’s absence.
38. Id. at 583.
39. Id. at 451.
40. David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1117, 1137 (2003). See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 174
(Wash. 2005) (relying on E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999)).
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to respect and understand a child’s reality, rather than “expressing sunny
optimism about children’s natural resiliency in the face of grievous emotional loss.”41 The termination of sibling relationships jeopardizes children’s intellectual, psychological, emotional, and social development. It
deprives children of support and affection that would be beneficial to them
following a significant disruption in their lives—the separation of their
parents and the dissolution of their family unit, which could also involve
relocation and a change in financial circumstances.42
B. The Unique Nature of Sibling Relationships
Sibling relationships are unique from the parent-child relationship and
from children’s relationships with third parties because “the sibling bond
crosses a lifespan,”43 having the potential to become a person’s most
enduring relationship of his or her life. Siblings, especially those who are
close in age, experience stages of development and important achievements—including childhood, puberty, young adulthood, marriage, parenthood, and old age—at or around the same time, and can share, learn from,
and enrich each other’s experiences. Siblings who differ significantly in
age may develop relationships that function on multiple levels: sibling,
parent, friend, and confidant. Siblings may also be more inclined to interact with each other more frequently or on a deeper level than with their
parents.44 Preserving sibling relationships provides children with a
“potential life-long familial relationship” and “life-long companionship.”45 Such relationships are different in kind from the intergenerational
relationships often litigated in contemporary case law.
C. The Societal Benefits of Sibling Relationships
Society benefits from the preservation of sibling relationships. Children
who are separated from siblings may experience a decreased sense of stability, identity, family, and culture. Thus, “sibling relationships are more
than mere conveniences to a healthy society,”46 because they provide
important benefits. If siblings are not permitted to preserve those relationships, such benefits are never realized. Access between siblings is imper41. Id. at 1134.
42. Williams, supra note 35, at 282 (citations omitted) “[W]hile parents are potentially the
most stable figure[s] in a child’s life,” sibling relationships have significant value because they
can help children cope with the absence of parental figures. Dana E. Prescott, Biological
Altruism, Splitting Siblings and the Judicial Process: A Child’s Right to Constitutional
Protection in Family Dislocation, 71 UMKC L. REV. 623, 641 (2003).
43. Marshall, supra note 29, at 104 (internal citation omitted).
44. Id. at 100.
45. Williams, supra note 35, at 260–61, 281–82.
46. Prescott, supra note 42, at 632.
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ative, and helps preserve important, life-long relationships, even if the siblings no longer live together.47 Children of same-sex unions possess
important social and family connections, which they may lose if they are
not allowed to maintain sibling relationships after their parents separate.
D. The Problem of Sibling Access
When siblings live in the same household, access is natural. When the
adult relationship dissolves, parents determine access among siblings and
may not always act in their children’s best interests, either intentionally or
unintentionally, particularly if doing so is inconvenient or causes the
adults emotional turmoil.48 Although no hard and fast rules exist regarding the separation of siblings, most courts are reluctant to separate siblings.49 In a typical divorce case, the potential separation of siblings is
usually one factor among many in the best-interests-of-the-child analysis,
however, some courts apply an exceptional or compelling circumstances
test to split custody of children. Even if extraordinary circumstances support split custody, the split usually must still be in the children’s best interests.50 In instances where siblings are separated, liberal visitation generally preserves at least some access. Siblings may also be able to take advantage of third-party access statutes, and courts can invoke their equitable
powers to prevent a sibling separation.51 Whether courts are “properly
equipped to enforce such visitation” is a separate, but concerning issue.52
E. Sibling Access After a Same-Sex Family Dissolves
Because only a few cases have raised the issue of sibling access in the
context of same-sex families, it is difficult to determine what courts will
do. While courts could use a best-interests-of-the-child analysis, some
scholars have argued that the best-interests standard is actually more
reflective of parents’ interests, particularly in the case of adoptive or halfsiblings, making it an ineffectual tool “unless the law contemplates the
47. Williams, supra note 35, at 262. (“the continuation of interactions between siblings over
a lifespan is dependent upon three factors: whether a living sibling exists, whether that sibling
resides within an accessible distance, and whether the siblings have actual contact through visitation, telephoning, and/or letter writing”).
48. Williams, supra note 35, at 262.
49. Prescott, supra note 42, at 641. Factors that are often taken into consideration in determining whether to separate siblings include: the relative ages of the children, school and academic activities, relocation, special emotional or disability needs of the children, preference of
the children, gender correlation between the children and parents, and animosity between the
children and parents. Id. at 638–40.
50. Prescott, supra note 42, at 637.
51. Williams, supra note 35, at 269. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 893 A.2d 934 (Del. 2006).
52. Marshall, supra note 29, at 101.
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child’s best interests from the child’s perspective.”53 Unfortunately, a
child’s desire to retain access to a half-sibling is likely to be considered a
mere “wish,” rather than a protected interest, one that will be “balanced
against finances, convenience, and tradition in a conventional manner.”54
In same-sex families, a child’s access to his or her half-sibling likely
depends on the success or failure of a de facto parent’s petition for visitation or custody of her ex-partner’s child. For example, in Smith v. Smith,
four children were born into and raised in a same-sex family.55 Erica
Smith gave birth to triplets; several years later, her partner, Shelia Smith,
used the same sperm donor and gave birth to another child, Samantha.
After the parties’ relationship ended, a Delaware family court held that
Shelia was the triplets’ de facto parent over Erica’s objections and granted Shelia’s petition for joint custody and visitation.56 Although Erica did
not seek visitation with Samantha, the family court concluded that “such
visitation should occur frequently and regularly, particularly since the
triplets appear[ed] to have a strong relationship with Samantha.”57
Therefore, although the Delaware Supreme Court did not impose visitation on Erica, it upheld the lower court’s decision, encouraging and permitting such visitation because doing so would benefit all of the Smith
children.
Other courts have considered the child support obligations for children
born into same-sex relationships, but failed to ensure that sibling relationships were maintained. In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, a lesbian couple
used a common sperm donor to create a family. Elisa B. gave birth to
Chance, and Emily B. gave birth to twins less than a year later. The
women then raised the children together. After their relationship dissolved, the California Supreme Court required Elisa B. to pay child support to Emily B. for the twins, but did not consider whether the women
should have access to their nonbiological children or whether the three
siblings should be permitted to have access to each other.58
Other courts, including the Black court, have expressed only marginal
concern for sibling relationships in same-sex families. Within the context
of litigation regarding same-sex families, courts sometimes preserve a traditional conception of the family (the parent-child relationship) at the
expense of a larger family unit (the sibling-sibling relationship) that might
53. Id. at 106. Although Marshall’s article only discusses half-siblings who have been separated or faced separation after the death of a common parent, such a situation makes for an apt
comparison of half-siblings of same-sex couples.
54. Marshall, supra note 29, at 101–02, 109.
55. Smith v. Smith, 893 A.2d 934 (Del. 2006).
56. Id. at 936.
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 114 (Cal. 2005).
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have greater long-term benefits for children than permitting legal parents
to have absolute control over the custody of their children.
V. The Louisiana Court of Appeal’s Reasoning in Black v. Simms
A. Custody and Visitation Standard Versus Third-Party Disputes
Louisiana has long held that a legal parent’s right to the custody of his
or her child is paramount against any third party.59 Currently, Louisiana
Civil Code article 133 governs custody disputes between legal parents60
and third parties, and article 136 governs visitation rights for third parties
and for legal parents who have not been granted custody. Article 133
states:
If an award of joint custody or of sole custody to either parent would result in
substantial harm to the child, the court shall award custody to another person
with whom the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment,
or otherwise to any other person able to provide an adequate and stable environment.61

Article 133’s current language appears to retain the primacy of a legal parent’s paramount right of custody, and likely provides limited room for
third parties to seek custody or visitation.
Custody and visitation law in Louisiana as it relates to untraditional
families is currently unclear. A split has developed among the circuits of
the Louisiana Court of Appeal, and, after the Black decision, among the
panels of the third circuit, regarding the appropriate test to be applied
under Art. 133.62 The first circuit has interpreted Art. 133 strictly, finding
that legal parents’ rights are paramount (even if those parents were not
involved in their children’s lives for significant periods) and that a finding
of substantial harm is necessary before awarding sole or joint custody to
59. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (1994) [hereinafter art. 133] cmt. (b) (citing Deville v.
LaGrange, 388 So.2d 696, 697–98 (La. 1980)). Prior to 1982, a legal parent could only be
deprived of custody if he or she had forfeited his or her right to parenthood, was found unfit, or
was unable to provide a home for the child. Art. 133 cmt. (b). Additionally, the use of the best
interest standard was improper in custody contests between legal parents and third parties. Id.
(citing Jones v. Jones, 415 So.2d 300 (La. Ct. App. 1982)). In 1982, the Louisiana legislature
sought to provide courts with “more freedom or latitude to pursue the goal of insuring that the
best interest of the child is served in resolving custody disputes between parent and nonparent
litigants.” Art. 133 cmt. (b) (citing Boyett v. Boyett, 448 So.2d 819, 822 (La. Ct. App. 1984)).
However, parental primacy was still paramount in such custody disputes.
60. In Louisiana, the legal relationship between a parent and child is demonstrated by establishing maternity or paternity or through adoption. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 179 (2009).
61. Art. 133.
62. See Williams v. Boone, 733 So. 2d 1257 (La. Ct. App. 1999); In re Landrum, 704 So.
2d 872 (La. Ct. App. 1997). But see Robert v. Gaudet, 691 So. 2d 780 (La. Ct. App. 1997);
Rupert v. Swinford, 671 So. 2d 502 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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a third party.63 In contrast, prior to the Black decision, the third circuit had
developed an approach that was potentially much more favorable to untraditional families.
In disputes between a legal parent and grandparents who had stepped
into caregiving for their grandchildren, either out of necessity or at the
request of a legal parent, the third circuit held in Williams v. Boone and In
re Landrum64 that the substantial harm standard does not need to be
applied when joint custody is awarded to a legal parent and a third party
as long as that award is in the child’s best interest.65 Both Williams and
Landrum held that an initial determination of joint custody between a
legal parent and a third party—such as a de facto parent—could be made
without requiring the third party to establish that substantial harm would
result if sole custody were awarded to a legal parent.66 Based on this
precedent, the Black court could have made a similar determination.

63. Robert, 691 So. 2d 780; Rupert, 671 So. 2d at 505. In Rupert, the first circuit held that
in order to award joint custody to a legal parent and a third party, a trial court must determine
that joint custody to the legal mother and father would result in substantial harm to the child;
sole custody to the legal mother would result in substantial harm to the child; and sole custody
to the legal father would result in substantial harm to the child. Rupert, 671 So. 2d at 504.
According to Rupert, however, even if a court found that awarding one legal parent sole custody would result in substantial harm to the child, that parent could still receive joint custody
with a third party. Id. at 505. Based on cases subsequent to Black v. Simms, it is clear that in the
first circuit, gay and lesbian de facto parents have little, if any, chance of obtaining custody of
their ex-partners’ children, even if the legal parent agrees to or desires joint custody. See In re
Melancon, 62 So. 3d 759 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (denying the unopposed petition to share custody
of a child with the biological mother because the de facto parent (the mother’s ex-partner) failed
to allege that an award of sole custody to the biological mother would result in substantial harm
to the child as required by art. 133); see also id. at *10 (Pettigrew, J., concurring) (“I am constrained to follow the law as it presently exists in the State of Louisiana. . . . I further note that
if there is going to be any change of the existing law, it should be addressed by the Louisiana
State Legislature.”). See also Lovell v. Billiot, 30 So. 3d 1182 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (permitting
visitation but not joint custody when maternal grandparents failed to show that an award of sole
custody to the child’s biological father would result in substantial harm).
64. Both Williams and Landrum involved disputes between a legal parent and grandparents
when the grandparents had stepped in to care for their grandchildren either out of necessity or
at the request of a legal parent.
65. Williams, 733 So. 2d at 1260 (“This language [the introductory language under Art.
133] does not contemplate application of the substantial harm standard when joint custody is
awarded to a parent and a non-parent.”); In re Landrum, 704 So. 2d at 875 (“However, we note
that Article 133 states, ‘If an award of joint custody . . . to either parent would result in substantial harm to the child, [then] the court shall award custody to another person. . . .’ In this
case the court did award joint custody to the mother. Hence, we find the burden of proving ‘substantial harm to the child’ inapplicable. To that extent we disagree with Robert.”) (emphasis in
original).
66. Williams, 733 So. 2d at 1259–60; In re Landrum, 704 So. 2d at 876.
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B. The Black v. Simms Decision
In Black, the Louisiana Court of Appeal again considered the appropriate test to be applied under article 133, albeit in the context of a samesex family, and found that a legal parent’s interest in the care, custody,
and control of her child was paramount against the claims of her ex-partner.67 The Black court addressed two questions: (1) under Louisiana’s
statutory scheme, what is the appropriate standard by which to judge a gay
or lesbian de facto parent’s petition for sole or joint custody over a legal
parent’s objection, and (2) can “substantial harm” encompass the separation of a child from an adult who planned for the child’s birth and subsequently lived with and parented that child?68
1. AWARD

OF

CUSTODY

TO A

PERSON OTHER THAN

A

PARENT

Black held that a gay or lesbian de facto parent is not precluded from
being considered for an award of joint custody. Before a court may award
custody, however, it must find that substantial harm will result to the child
if sole custody is, instead, awarded to the legal parent. Thus, the Black
court closely followed the reasoning of the first circuit, rather than of the
third circuit. The Black court also held that the appropriate test between a
legal parent and a third party consisted of two prongs: (1) the court must
determine that an award of custody to the legal parent would cause substantial harm to the child, and (2) only after making such a finding, may
a court then apply a best interests analysis to determine whether an award
of custody to a de facto parent would serve the child’s best interests.69
The Black court disagreed with the Williams and Landrum decisions. In
particular, Black criticized In re Landrum, which emphasized Louisiana’s
concern with the best interests of the child as evidenced by the plain language of article 131 and its commentary.70 Black also relied on Troxel to
bolster its findings.71 Although the Black court acknowledged that litigation frequently occurs between psychological and legal parents, it stated
that the legislature provided for such circumstances under article 136—
which permits reasonable visitation for legal parents not granted joint or
67. Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
68. Id. Under Louisiana law, there is a presumption of joint custody in disputes between
legal parents. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. article 132 (1994). Also, as noted infra, the Black court did
not specifically address Braelyn’s separation from her half-brother, Eli.
69. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1142-43.
70. Louisianna Civil Code Annotated article 131 states that courts “shall award custody of
a child in accordance with the best interest of the child,” and the commentary clarifies that the
best interest standard is the “overriding test” and “govern[s] all articles of [the Child Custody
Section],” including initial determinations of custody as well as modifications. LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 131 (1994); art. 131 cmt. (a) & (d).
71. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1143.
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sole custody72 as well as reasonable visitation rights for relatives, by blood
or affinity, or former stepparents or step grandparents—and Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:344, which provides for grandparent and sibling visitation rights.73
The court also rejected Black’s arguments that it should exercise its
equitable powers in light of the lack of statutory provisions governing
same-sex families. Although the court agreed that no such laws exist in
Louisiana, it stated there were also no laws that governed “heterosexual
relationships in which only one of the parties is the biological parent.”74
The court stated: “Any non-parent who has a relationship with a biological parent and develops a relationship with the child has to meet the same
standard in establishing a basis for custody of the child,” including grandparents and stepparents. While Black did not preclude gay and lesbian de
facto parents from seeking custody or visitation under article 133, it held
that a legal parent’s rights are generally paramount.75 Additionally, since
the Black court concluded that a substantial harm standard was appropriate, rather than, for example, a presumption in favor of the legal parent, a
court may not even reach the best-interests-of-the-child analysis in many
Louisiana custody and visitation cases.
2. SUBSTANTIAL HARM

The Black court held that “substantial harm” cannot encompass the
separation of a child from a gay or lesbian de facto parent who planned
for the child’s birth and subsequently lived with and parented that child.
Black did not specifically address whether separating Braelyn from her
half-brother, Eli, would cause her substantial harm. The Black court stated that the term “substantial harm” includes situations such as parental
unfitness, neglect, abuse, inability to provide a home, abandonment of
parental rights, prolonged separation of the child from his or her natural
parents, and “other circumstances that would cause the child to suffer positive and substantial harm.”76 Black argued that cutting off Braelyn’s
access to Black and Eli would cause Braelyn substantial harm. Black
introduced evidence that she shared a parent-child bond with Braelyn,
which would be terminated if she were not awarded access. Additionally,
72. An award of reasonable visitation is presumed for parents who do not have custody
unless the court finds that it is not in the best interests of the child. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136
(2009).
73. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1143; Art. 136; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (1999).
74. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1143.
75. But see In re Melancon, 62 So. 3d 759 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Lovell v. Billiot, 30 So. 3d
1182 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
76. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1144 (relying on Merritt v. Merrit, 550 So. 2d 882 (La. Ct. App.
1989); Mills v. Wilkerson, 785 So. 2d 69 (La. Ct. App. 2001)).
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Black argued that an award of sole custody to Simms would sever Braelyn
from the loving, involved family unit of which she was a part for the first
six years of her life.77
Despite its misgivings about the behavior of both parties,78 the Black
court found that Black failed to meet her burden of proving that an award
of sole or joint custody to a legal parent would cause a child substantial
harm.79 While characterizing Simms’ actions as “harsh and inconsiderate,” the court concluded that it could not state for certain that Braelyn’s
separation from a “family friend,” presumably Black, would amount to
substantial harm.80 The court acknowledged that Braelyn had an “obvious
affection and attachment” to the Blacks,81 but never specifically discussed
Braelyn’s attachment to Eli or whether separation from him would cause
either child substantial harm or would be in the children’s best interests.
VI. Louisiana’s Lost Opportunity to Benefit Children
by Preserving Sibling Relationships
Like other courts before it,82 the Louisiana Court of Appeal missed an
important opportunity to provide children in same-sex families with the
benefit of legally recognized access to their de facto parents and siblings.
Rather than permitting Braelyn to maintain relationships with Black and
Eli, which Braelyn herself expressed were significant to her, the Louisiana
Court of Appeal erred on the side of protecting Simms’ paramount interest in the care, custody, and control of her daughter without ever considering the best interests of Braelyn.
This section discusses four main critiques of Black v. Simms. First, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal interpreted Troxel too broadly. Second, the
77. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1144.
78. According to the court, both parties made “bad decisions.” Id. at 1145. Black used
drugs two years prior to the dissolution of the parties’ relationship and three years prior to her
petition for custody. However, no evidence was presented that Black currently used drugs. The
court also characterized Simms’ actions as “harsh and inconsiderate.” Id.
79. Id. at 1144–45.
80. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added). The Louisiana Court of Appeal refused to deal with the
proverbial “elephant in the room: whether [same-sex individuals] in an intimate domestic relationship each have the right to parent the children they mutually agree that one party will adopt
[or conceive].” Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 610 (Mont. 2009) (Nelson, J., concurring).
After concluding that the Louisiana legislature was silent on the issue of children of same-sex
families, the Louisiana Court of Appeal dismissed Black’s arguments by stating that “there are
no laws governing heterosexual relationships in which only one of the parties is the biological
parent.” Black, 12 So. 3d at 1143. Despite the Black court’s representation, this is not strictly
true as stepparents are entitled to petition for reasonable visitation under LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
article 136(B). Thus, the Black court’s dismissal of Black’s arguments appears not only to be
incorrect, but also disingenuous.
81. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1145.
82. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 108 (2005).
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Black court interpreted Louisiana’s statutory scheme too narrowly
because it could have found that Black was entitled to joint custody of
Braelyn based on previous decisions of the third circuit. Third, the court
could have incorporated the concept of de facto parenthood into
Louisiana’s statutory scheme without compromising the liberty interests
of legal parents. Finally, the court should have incorporated the concept
of de facto parenthood into Louisiana’s statutory scheme because doing
so would have been in the best interests of Braelyn and Eli and of children
generally.
A. The Louisiana Court of Appeal Interpreted Troxel Too Broadly
The Black court interpreted Troxel too broadly because the Supreme
Court left room for recognition of de facto parents’ claims, especially if
doing so would benefit the children involved. The Supreme Court
expressly stated it was not adopting a per se rule for third-party claims.83
The Black court relied too heavily on the plurality statement that “so long
as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit) there will
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm
of the family.”84 However, the lower court’s intervention in Troxel was
not the problem. Rather, the lower court failed to honor the long-held presumption in favor of a legal parent’s decision making, which a third party
might then rebut.85
The Black court also failed to take into account some of the fine distinctions drawn in Troxel—explicitly by the dissenters and more subtly by
the plurality—between various third parties. Justice Kennedy expressed
concern that the plurality’s reasoning might be interpreted too broadly and
might be unjustifiably applied against third parties who have a “legitimate
and established relationship with the child,” including de facto parents
and siblings.86 Although it approached the issue more cautiously, the plurality noted that its opinion concerned “persons outside the nuclear family” and suggested that the “intergenerational relationship” between children and grandparents was likely distinguishable from an established de
facto parent-child or sibling relationship.87 The Black court erroneously
treated a parent’s liberty interest as something akin to a mandate, as
opposed to one that might be rebutted in appropriate circumstances.
Rather, the Black court should have considered more fully the import of
the Troxel opinion, which left room for untraditional families.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (plurality).
Id. at 68–69.
Id.
Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 70 (plurality).
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B. The Black Court Interpreted Louisiana’s
Statutory Scheme Too Narrowly
While the Louisiana Court of Appeal interpreted Troxel too broadly, it
interpreted the Louisiana statutory scheme for custody and visitation too
narrowly. In particular, the Black court failed to address the issue of sibling visitation, which is provided for under Louisiana law, even though
this issue was raised at trial and on appeal. Two Louisiana statutes govern
sibling visitation.88 Visitation decisions under statutes are made on a bestinterests-of-the-child analysis. References in Louisiana’s statutory
scheme regarding marriage and blood suggest intent to allow sibling visitation between children who are biologically related.
The Black court glossed over any interests Braelyn and Eli might have
had in continued access to each other. Although the Black court considered the potential harm to Braelyn if she were to be separated from Black,
a “family friend,” it did not specifically consider the potential damage in
separating her from Eli, her biological sibling with whom she was raised
for several years. Even if the Black court made such a determination without explicitly stating it, the court concluded that since the harm threshold
was not met, it could not proceed to the best interests analysis.89
Therefore, the issue of sibling access was incorrectly conflated with
Black’s de facto parent claims and was considered under the inappropriate standard of substantial harm, rather than of best interests. The Black
court discounted Louisiana’s overriding concern for children’s welfare
and failed to apply the best-interests-of-the-child standard, which article
131 explicitly states must be applied in all custody determinations.90 This
is contrary to the Louisiana legislature’s express commitment to protecting sibling relationships.
C. The Black Court Should Have Considered de Facto Parenthood
The Black court could have incorporated the concept of de facto parenthood into Louisiana’s statutory scheme without compromising legal
parents’ liberty interests. Family courts may exercise their equitable pow88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344(D) states:
If the parents of a minor child or children of the marriage are legally separated or living apart
for a period of six months, the grandparents or siblings of the child or children may have reasonable visitation rights to the child or children during their minority, if the court in its discretion finds that such visitation rights would be in the best interest of the child or children.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 states:
Under extraordinary circumstances, a relative, by blood or affinity, or a former stepparent or
step-grandparent, not granted custody of the child may be granted reasonable visitation rights
if the court finds that it is in the best interest of the child.

89. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1145.
90. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131.
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ers when gaps exist in a state’s statutory scheme, so long as the action the
court takes does not contradict that statutory scheme.91 Family courts
may, and often do, fill in those gaps with common law doctrines, such as
de facto parenthood. Such “equity powers and common law responsibilit[ies]” enable courts “to respond to the needs of children and families
in the face of changing realities.” The Black court could have incorporated the concept of de facto parenthood into Louisiana’s statutory scheme,
which already includes specific provisions for custody awards to “persons
other than parents.”92 Doing so would have made it more likely that
Braelyn and Eli, as well as other children, would have access to one
another. Additionally, the Black court could have found that sibling visitation for Braelyn and Eli was appropriate since Louisiana’s statutory
scheme clearly supports such awards between biological siblings.93
The Black court should have incorporated the concept of de facto parenthood into Louisiana’s statutory scheme because it would have been in
the best interests of Braelyn and Eli and of children generally. The
Louisiana Court of Appeal upheld the separation of Braelyn from two
members of her nuclear family. That separation was not based on the relationship between Braelyn and Eli or between Braelyn and her de facto
parent, but on the relationship between the two adults. This is the antithesis of the best-interests standard, a fundamental foundation of family law.
Unless the situation is severe, custody and visitation decisions that
result in the complete isolation of a child from a biological sibling undermine the best interests of children. Decisions to separate biological siblings should not be based on a standard that completely subordinates the
child’s interests to his or her legal parent’s interests without regard for his
or her other associational and developmental needs. Maintaining
Braelyn’s relationship with Eli was not only possible, but also would have
been in both children’s best interests.94 As discussed supra, children
receive substantial benefits when their sibling relationships are preserved.
These benefits are not diluted by the fact that the children involved were
born into a same-sex family. As the first circuit of the Louisiana Court of
Appeal noted: “[v]ictories in these battles [legal parents versus de facto
parents] hurt the child more than they help the adults. The parties do not
have to . . . even like each other, but they do need to put the child first in
91. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 169, 174 (Wash. 2005).
92. Art. 133.
93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344(D).
94. Even the concurrence’s attempt to temper the Black majority failed because Judge
Cooks’ belief that the parties’ animosity negated an award of custody or visitation to Black did
not justify the total isolation of Braelyn from her half-brother, Eli. Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d
1140, 1145 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (Cooks, J., concurring).
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their dealings with each other.”95 However, putting children first requires
that courts ensure that children are able to maintain important sibling relationships.
VII. Conclusion
Social science evidence, legal scholarship, and case law support the
maintenance of sibling relationships. In Black v. Simms, the Louisiana
Court of Appeal missed an important opportunity to provide children in
same-sex households with the benefit of legally recognized access to their
siblings. When the law fails to adapt to the changing composition of the
American family, it is children who suffer.

95. Robert v. Gaudet, 691 So. 2d 780, 785 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

